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Abstract 
This study analyses the interest margin in the principal European banking sectors 
(Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) in the period 1993-2000 using 
a panel of 15,888 observations, identifying the fundamental elements affecting this 
margin. Our starting point is the methodology developed in the original study by Ho and 
Saunders (1981) and later extensions, but widened to take banks’ operating costs 
explicitly into account. Also, unlike the usual practice in the literature, a direct measure 
of the degree of competition (Lerner index) in the different markets is used. The results 
show that the fall of margins in the European banking system is compatible with a 
relaxation of the competitive conditions (increase in market power and concentration), 
as this effect has been counteracted by a reduction of interest rate risk, credit risk, and 
operating costs. 
Key words: margins, competition  
JEL Classification: G21, L11 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: Joaquín Maudos, Universitat de València. Dpto. de Análisis Económico. Edificio 
departamental oriental; Avda. de los Naranjos, s/n; 46022 Valencia, SPAIN. Fax: 34-96 393 08 56; 
Email: joaquin.maudos@uv.es
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (Ivie). C/ Guardia Civil 22, Esc. 2, 1º; 46020 
Valencia, Spain. Email: juan.fernandez@ivie.es
 
2  
1. Introduction* 
The banking sector plays a fundamental role in economic growth, as it is the 
basic element in the channelling of funds from lenders to borrowers. In this sense, it is 
important that this work of intermediation by the banks is carried out with the lowest 
possible cost in order to achieve greater social welfare. Obviously, the lower the banks’ 
interest margin, the lower the social costs of financial intermediation will be.  
In this context, one part of the literature on banking has concentrated on 
analysing the elements determining the interest margin. The pioneering study by Ho and 
Saunders (1981), starting from the conception of banking firms as mere intermediaries 
between lenders and borrowers, finds that the interest margin has two basic 
components: the degree of competition of the markets and the interest rate risk to which 
the bank is exposed. This model has been extended in several studies: Allen (1988) 
widens it to permit the existence of different types of credits and deposits; McShane and  
Sharpe (1985) change the source of interest rate risk, situating it in the uncertainty of the 
money markets instead of the interest rates on credits and  deposits, as in the original 
study by Ho and  Saunders (1981); Angbanzo (1997) extends the model to take into 
account credit risk as well as interest rate risk.  
This study analyses the interest margin in the principal European banking 
sectors, identifying the fundamental elements affecting this margin. The starting point 
for analysing the determinants of the interest margin is the original model of Ho and 
Saunders (1981) and later extensions by other authors, but widened to take 
banks´operating costs explicitly into account. Also, unlike the usual practice in the 
literature described above, we will use direct measurements of the degree of 
competition in the different markets, calculated by means of concentration indices or 
Lerner indices of market power. 
The reduction of the interest margin that has occurred in recent years in the 
banking sectors of the European Union is usually interpreted as a result of the growth of 
competition. However, in the light of the theoretical model, banking margins do not 
depend only on the intensity of competition, but also on other factors such as interest 
risk, credit risk, the evolution of operating costs, etc. A decrease in banking margins is 
therefore compatible with a decrease in the degree of competition if the effect of the 
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latter is counteracted by the effect of the evolution of the other determinants of the 
interest margin. 
In recent years many studies have been published1 which analyse the evolution 
of competition in the banking sectors of Europe in the context of phenomena like 
deregulation, globalisation, increased concentration due to mergers, etc. These studies 
concentrate, in general, on analysing the effect of market concentration on competition, 
considering neither the impact on margins nor the effect of variables other than 
competition which also affect banking margins, and  therefore intermediation costs. 
Of special interest because of the methodology and  sample used is the study by 
Saunders and  Schumacher (2000), who apply the original model of Ho and  Saunders 
(1981) to analyse the determinants of the interest margin in six countries of the 
European Union and in the United States during the period 1988-95. Our study differs 
from Saunders and  Schumacher (2000) in several aspects: a) we introduce the influence 
of operating costs into the modelling of the interest margin; b) we use  direct 
measurements of market power; c) the determinants of the interest margin are analysed 
in a single stage; d) it extends the period of study until the year 2000, though it is 
centred on the principal European countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy 
and  Spain); and  e) the sample consists of a panel data of 1,826 banks (in 2000), as 
opposed to the 614 of Saunders and  Schumacher’s study. 
The results of analysing the contribution of the different factors explaining the 
interest margin may be useful in the design of specific measures of economic policy. 
Thus, if a significant part of the evolution of the interest margin is explained by the 
volatility of interest rates and the credit risk instead of the market power of firms, public 
policies should be aimed at achieving a climate of financial stability. If, on the contrary, 
market power is the factor that most helps to explain the variability of the interest 
margin, public initiatives must be aimed at encouraging competition among banks. 
Obviously, depending on the contribution of the other variables explaining the interest 
margin (quality of management, operating costs, etc.), the specific measures of 
economic policy must be oriented towards specific aspects of banking business. 
 In this context, the study is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
methodology used to identify the determinants of the interest margin. Section 3 
develops the empirical specification of the model to be estimated and  of the variables, 
and the sample used is described in section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results of 
the estimation. Finally, section 6 contains the main conclusions of the study. 
                                                 
1
 Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), De Bandt and David (2000), Bikker, and Haaf (2002), among others. 
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2. The determinants of the interest margin 
 The starting point for analysing the determinants of the interest margin is the 
model of Ho and Saunders (1981). Different versions of the model have been estimated 
for the specific case of the United States in Ho and Saunders (1981), Allen (1988) and 
Angbazo (1997); and for a sample of seven OCDE countries (six European ones plus 
the United States) in Saunders and Schumacher (2000). 
In this models, a bank is viewed as a risk-averse dealer in the credit market2, 
acting as an intermediary between demanders and suppliers of funds. The planning 
horizon is a single period during which the bank sets interest rates at the beginning of 
the period, before any deposits or loans are made, remain constant for the whole period. 
The banks, who are risk averse and have to deal with demands for loans, and offers of 
deposits, that reach them asymmetrically in time, must set interest rates on loans (rL) 
and deposits (rD) optimally so as to minimise the risk deriving from the uncertainty of 
interest rates in the money markets to which they have to resort in the event of excessive 
demand for loans or insufficient supply of deposits. For this, they set their interest rates 
as a margin relative to the interest rate of the money market (r), i.e.: 
 Dr r a= −    (1) 
 Lr r b= +  
a and  b being the margins relative to the money market interest rate set by the banks for 
deposits and  loans, respectively. Hence the unit margin or spread s can be expressed as 
follows: 
 L Ds r r a b= − = +  (2) 
The intuition of the model is as follows. Let us suppose that a new deposit 
reaches the bank before any new demand for loans. In this event, the bank will 
temporarily invest the funds received in the money market at an interest rate r, assuming 
a risk of reinvestment at the end of the period if money market interest rates fall. 
Similarly, if a new demand for loans reaches the bank before any new deposit, the bank 
will obtain the funds in the money market, and will therefore face a risk of refinancing 
if interest rates rise. Furthermore, the return of loans is uncertain because of the 
probability that some of them will not be repaid, i.e. due to the credit risk. Consequently 
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 The assumption of risk averse behaviour on the part of banks has been justified extensively in the 
literature (see, among others, McShane and Sharpe, 1985; and Angbazo, 1997). 
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the bank will apply a margin to loans (b) and  deposits (a) that will compensate for both 
the interest rate and credit risk. 
 The initial wealth of the bank is determined by the difference between its assets 
– loans (L) and net money market assets (M)- and its liabilities – deposits (D): 
 W0= L0 -D0+M0=I0+M0 (3) 
Lo-Do  being the net credit inventory (I0). 
 The criticism by Lerner (1981) of the original model of Ho and  Saunders (1981) 
is taken up incorporating into the model the productive nature of the banking firm by 
including the production costs associated with the process of intermediation between 
deposits and loans. Thus, the operating costs of a banking firm are assumed to be a 
function of the deposits captured (C(D)) and  the loans made (C(L)), so that the costs of 
the net credit inventory can be expressed as  C(I)=C(L)-C(D). 
 With all these assumptions, the final wealth of the bank will be: 
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= + =  is the average risk of the net credit inventory3. ZM and  ZL 
reflect the uncertainty faced by the banks, which is of two kinds: interest rate risk, 
distributed as a random variable ZM-N(0,σ2M ), and  credit risk – the profitability of the 
loan is uncertain and is distributed as a random variable ZL-N(0, σ2L). In order to take 
into account the interaction between credit risk and interest rate risk the joint 
distribution of the two disturbances is assumed to be bivariate normal with non-null 
covariance (σLM). 
 Banks are maximizers of expected utility. The bank’s utility function is 
approximated using the Taylor expansion around the expected level of wealth 
( )(WEW = ): 
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 It is assumed that the deposits are an activity that is not subject to any kind of risks. Hence, ZD=0. 
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where it is assumed that the bank’s utility function is continuous doubly differentiable 
with U´>0 and  U´´<0 and  therefore that the bank is risk averse4. 
 When a new deposit D is made, remunerated at a rate rD, the bank, if it does not 
grant an additional credit, will invest the funds thus captured in the money market, 
obtaining a return (r+ZM)D. Bearing in mind that 0 0L MW W L Z M Z− = + , and  given 
the existence of operating costs in the capture of deposits C(D), substituting the new 
value of the final wealth in (5) we find that the increase in expected utility associated 
with the new deposit will be5: 
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Similarly, if a new request for credit is made for which there is also a cost of production 
C(L), the increase in expected utility would be: 
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As in the other models we assume that credits and  deposits are made randomly 
according to a Poisson process, the probability of granting a credit or capturing a 
deposit being a decreasing function of the margins applied by the bank: 
 
Pr
Pr
D D D
L L L
a
b
α β
α β
= −
= −
 (8) 
The problem of maximisation is therefore as follows: 
 
,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a b D D D L L LMax EU W a EU W b EU Wα β α β∆ = − ∆ + − ∆  (9) 
The first order conditions with respect to a and  b are6: 
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 If the bank were risk neutral, the bank would be an expected wealth maximizer. 
5
 See the appendix. 
6
 It is assumed, following Ho and Saunders (1981) and subsequent extensions, that the second order terms  
of the margins and costs of the Taylor’s expansion of expressions (6) and (7) are negligible.  
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so the optimal interest  margin s is equal to: 
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Therefore, according to the theoretical model used, the determinants of the 
interest margin are as follows: 
a) The competitive structure of the markets. This depends on the elasticity of the 
demand for loans and the supply of deposits (β), such that the less elastic the 
demand for credit (or supply of deposits), the less will be the value of β, and the 
bank will be able to apply high margins if it exercises monopoly power. 
Consequently, the ratio α/β proxies the possible monopoly profits implicit in bank 
margins. 
b) Average operating costs. The extension of the model realized in this paper yield the 
inclusion of an additional term, the average operating costs, in the explanatory 
equation of the interest margin. Consequently, firms that incur high unit costs will 
logically need to work with higher margins to enable them to cover their higher 
operating costs. Observe that, even in the absence of market power and of any kind 
of risk, a positive margin will be necessary in order to cover operating costs. 
c) Risk aversion, expressed by the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 
-U´´(W)/U´(W), where on the assumption that the bank is risk averse, U´´(W)<0,   
the former expression is greater than zero. Obviously, the more risk-averse banks 
will charge higher margins7. 
                                                 
7In the risk-neutral case (the bank is wealth maximizer), the interest margin would depend only on market 
power and operating costs. 
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d) The volatility of money market interest rates (σ2M). The more volatile they are, the 
greater will be the market risk, and it will therefore be necessary to operate with 
higher margins, as the banks will require a higher premium at the margin.  
e) The credit risk, captured by the variable σ2L. The greater the uncertainty or the 
volatility of the return expected on the loans granted (risk of default), the greater 
will be the margin with which the bank works. 
f) The covariance or interaction between interest rate risk and credit risk σLM.  
g) The average size of the credit and deposit operations undertaken by the bank 
(captured by the term L+D) and the total volume of credits (L+2L0). The model 
predicts that the unit margins are an increasing function of the average size of 
operations. The justification is that, for a given value of credit risk and of market 
risk, an operation of greater size would mean a greater potential loss, so the bank 
will require a greater margin. Likewise, the potential loss will be greater for those 
banks in which the volume of  credits granted is greater. 
The assumptions made in deriving the interest margin from the theoretical model 
set out provide a margin that could be called “pure”. Obviously, in practice there exist 
other variables that explain the interest margin, capturing the influence of aspects -
institutional, regulatory, etc. – which potentially distort the pure margin and are difficult 
to incorporate into the theoretical model. Specifically, the additional variables 
considered in the literature are: 
h) The payment of implicit interest: the bank, instead of remunerating deposits 
explicitly by paying an interest rate, offers various “free” banking services. 
i) The opportunity cost of keeping reserves. The maintenance of bank reserves 
remunerated at an interest rate below that of the market involves costs whose 
magnitude will depend on the volume of reserves and on their opportunity cost. The 
sign is expected to be positive, as the greater the volume of liquid reserves, the 
greater the opportunity costs, so a greater interest margin is needed. 
j) The quality of management. As shown by Angbanzo (1997), good management 
implies selecting highly profitable assets and low-cost liabilities, so a positive 
relationship is to be expected between the quality of management and the interest 
margin. 
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3. Empirical approach 
Empirical approach 
There are two empirical approaches to the model of Ho and Saunders (1981) and 
its subsequent extensions. On the one hand, in Ho and Saunders (1981) and Saunders 
and Schumacher (2000) the empirical estimation of the determinants of the interest 
margin follows a two-stage process. In the first stage, the effect of the explanatory 
variables of the interest margin not explicitly introduced into the theoretical model is 
controlled in order to obtain an estimate of the “pure” margin. The second stage 
analyses the relationship between this “pure” margin and the variables posited by the 
theoretical model. The application of this approach has the advantage that it allows a 
“pure” interest margin to be estimated, though it requires a time series long enough to 
be able to estimate the pure margin. 
On the other hand, McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Angbazo (1997) use a 
single-stage approach, including in the explanation of the interest margin both the 
variables of the theoretical model and the additional variables or imperfections that 
reflect other aspects not incorporated into the modelling of the pure margin.  
Since the period studied in this paper covers the years 1993 to 2000, the 
availability of annual observations for 8 years makes it impossible to apply the two-
stage methodology, so we use the single-stage methodology. 
 
Variables 
The estimation of the theoretical model developed in the previous section for the 
specific case of the banking sectors of the European countries considered requires the 
variables of the model to be proxied empirically as a function of the statistical 
information available in the data base. 
According to the theoretical model presented, there are seven variables that 
determine the interest margin: the structure of the market, unit operating costs, the 
banks’ degree of risk aversion, the volatility of market interest rates, credit risk, the 
covariance between the latter and market risk, the average size of operations and the 
volume of credits granted. The three imperfections mentioned above are also included. 
Each of these variables is proxied empirically as follows: 
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a) Market structure 
To proxy the competitive structure of the market two alternative variables will be 
used. First, the degree of concentration of the market in which the banks compete, 
proxied by the Herfindahl index (HERF), is used. This index, defined as the sum of the 
squares of the market shares, is proxied on the assumption that competition takes place 
on a national scale, as only in the case of big banks and in wholesale markets could a 
greater than national market be assumed8. Total assets are used as a proxy of banking 
activity. 
Second, an alternative indicator of the degree of competition in banking markets is 
the estimation of the Lerner index (LERNER), widely used in the specific case of 
banks9. This index, defined as the difference between the price and the marginal cost, 
divided by the price, measures the capacity to set prices above the marginal cost, being 
an inverse function of the elasticity of demand and of the number of banks10. The values 
of the index range from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly). The empirical 
approach to the Lerner index is based on the procedure used in Maudos and Pérez 
(2001) and Fernández de Guevara et al. (2001) where the prices are calculated by 
estimating the average price of bank production (proxied by total assets) as a quotient 
between total revenue and total assets. Algebraically, the Lerner index is 
 
i i
i
i
p MCLERNER
p
−
=
 (12) 
where the product price  pi=total revenue (interest income+other operating income)/total 
assets and MCi is the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of output. The 
marginal cost is estimated on the basis of the following translogarithmic cost function: 
                                                 
8
 As the European Commission acknowledges (FSAP, 1999), banking markets, especially in retail 
markets, are still highly segmented in European countries. For that reason, an objective of the Financial 
Services Action Plan is to achieve a single financial market integrated at European level in 2005. 
9
 See Prescott and McCall (1975) for the US banks, Shaffer (1993) for the Canadian banks, Ribon and 
Yosha (1999) for the case of Israel, Angelini and Cetorelli (1999) for Italian banks, Maudos and Pérez 
(2001) for the case of Spain and Fernández de Guevara et al (2001) for a sample of major European 
countries. 
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 See Freixas and Rochet (1997), chapter 3. 
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where Ci are the bank’s total costs (financial and operating), TAi total assets, and wi the 
price of the factors of production as defined below: 
-w1 = price  of labour: personnel costs / total assets11. 
-w2 = price of physical capital: operating costs (except personnel costs)/ fixed assets. 
-w3 =price of deposits: financial costs /deposits12. 
 The costs function is estimated introducing fixed individual effects in order to 
capture the influence of variables specific to each bank. We also include a trend (Trend) 
to capture the influence of technical change leading to shifts in the cost function over 
time. As usual, the estimation is done under the restrictions of symmetry and degree one 
homogeneity in the prices of inputs.  
b) Operating costs 
Average operating costs are proxied as a quotient between operating expenses and 
total assets  (AOC).  
c) Degree of risk aversion  
Following the approach used by McShane and Sharpe (1985), the ratio equity / total 
assets13 is used as a proxy variable for the degree of risk aversion (RISKAVER). 
According to the theoretical model, a positive relation is expected between this variable 
and the interest margin, as those firms that are most risk averse will require a higher 
                                                 
11
 The data base used –BankScope- does not offer information on the number of workers, so the average 
price  of the labour factor is proxied as a quotient between personnel costs and total assets. 
12
 Specifically, deposits correspond to the heading customer and short term funding in BankScope 
database. 
13
 The equity /assets ratio is a measure of capitalisation, presenting limitations as a measure of risk 
aversion given the influence of regulation on minimum equity. The results obtained in relation to this 
variable must therefore be interpreted with caution. 
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margin in order to cover the higher costs of equity financing compared to external 
financing14. 
d) Volatility of market interest rates 
Uncertainty in the money markets is reflected in the theoretical model by the 
variance of market interest rates (σ2M). The empirical proxying of this variable is 
consequently based on a measurement of the volatility of market interest rates such as 
the standard deviation (SD). Specifically, we will use the annual standard deviation of 
daily interest rates of three alternative types, attempting to approximate the average 
period of maturity of the assets and liabilities in the banks’ balance sheets15: 
- The three-month interest rate in the inter-bank market (SD3M). 
- Return on medium term public debt in national markets: treasury bonds with 
three-year maturity period (SD3Y). 
-  Return on long term public debt in national markets: treasury bonds with ten 
year maturity period (SD10Y).  
On the basis of daily interest rate data we have calculated the corresponding annual 
deviations in each of the countries analysed16.  
e) Credit risk 
The risk of non-repayment or default on a credit (credit risk) requires the bank to 
apply a risk premium implicitly in the interest rates charged for the operation. Ideally, 
the credit risk could be proxied by variables such as problem loans and the provisions 
for insolvencies. Unfortunately, Bankscope database only offers these variables for a 
very small number of banks17, so credit risk will be proxied initially by the loans/total 
assets ratio (CRERISK). It is to be expected that firms specialising in the granting of 
                                                 
14A more adequate measure of risk aversion would be the capital held in excess of regulatory capital 
(capital buffer), but unfortunately the variable capital adequacy ratio is available only for a small number 
of banks (12% of the sample) because this ratio can not be calculated by looking at the balance sheet of a 
bank but has to be calculated internally by the bank (at their option they may publish this ratio in their 
annual report). 
15
 It has not been possible to obtain information on daily interest rates with other maturities.  
16
 The information was facilitated by the Bank of Spain. 
 
17
 For example, the variable non-performing loans is only available for 10% of the banks of the sample 
(for Germany, this variable is not available for any year of the sample). In the case of loan loss 
provisions, the variable is also available for a small group of banks (for Germany there are only 11 
observations), albeit more numerous than the one for the variable problem loans (28% of the sample). We 
will therefore check the robustness of the results using the variable loan loss provisions/loans as a proxy 
for credit risk. 
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loans are more exposed to credit risk, so this variable is expected to have a positive 
influence on the interest margin.  
f) Interaction between credit risk and market risk 
Interaction between credit risk and market risk (SD*CRERISK). As a proxy for this 
variable we use the product of the measurement of credit risk and the rate of interest, i.e. 
CRERISK and each of the variables of credit risk (SD3M, SD3Y, SD10Y). 
g) Average size of operations/ volume of loans 
Although the theoretical model shows the importance of the average size of 
operations as a determinant of the interest margin, the information contained in 
Bankscope does not permit this variable to be proxied empirically. In accordance with 
the theoretical model, however, the volume of loans granted (in logarithms) is included 
as an explanatory variable (SIZE). 
The additional variables other than those determining the “pure” interest margin, are 
proxied as follows: 
h) Implicit interest payments 
Following Ho and Saunders (1981), Angbanzo (1997) and Saunders and 
Schumacher (2000) we will use the variable operating expenses net of non-interest 
revenues, expressed as a percentage of total assets (IIP). A positive sign is expected.  
i) Opportunity costs of bank reserves  
This variable is proxied by the ratio of liquid reserves / total assets  (RESER), using 
the cash variable (cash and due from banks) as a proxy for bank reserves. 
j) Quality of management 
As mentioned earlier, high quality management translates into a profitable 
composition of assets and a low-cost composition of liabilities. The quality or efficiency 
of management is proxied by the cost to income ratio (EF) which is defined as the 
operating cost necessary to generate one unit of gross income. An increase in this ratio 
implies a decrease in the efficiency or quality of management, which will translate into 
a lower interest margin. So a negative sign is expected. 
 
14  
Finally, the net interest margin, defined as the difference between revenue and 
financial costs in relation to total assets  (NIM) is used as the dependent variable. 
 
4. Description of the sample 
The information used to estimate the model is taken from the Bureau Van Dijk’s 
BankScope data base, using unconsolidated financial statements, or consolidated ones if 
the former were not available. The analysis is conducted on individual banks. The 
sample contains a total of 15,888 observations corresponding to a number of banking 
firms that varies from 1,436 in 1993 to 1,796 in 2000. By countries, in 2000 Germany 
represents 64.5% of the total number of observations, Italy 19.4%, France 10.3%, Spain 
3.6% and the United Kingdom 2.4%. 
The sample used is less than the total number of observations in the data base, as 
the information has been filtered using two criteria: a) we eliminate those banks for 
which any of the variables necessary for estimating the explanatory model of the 
interest margin is not available; b) we have also eliminated the banks whose input prices 
(necessary for estimating the cost function) vary from the average for each country and 
year by more than two and a half times the standard deviation. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics both of the interest margin and of its 
explanatory variables for the whole sample of the European countries considered. In the 
case of the variable being studied– the net interest margin – there has been a reduction 
of 34% in the period analysed, to 1.28% in 2000. The competitive structure of the 
markets, proxied by the Lerner index, has not followed a uniform pattern. A reduction 
of market power occurred from 1993 to 1995, and an increase thereafter, such that the 
value of the index in 2000 (16.80) was higher than that of 1993 (15.84), so an increase 
in competitive conditions was not verified. This result is similar to the evidence 
contributed by Fernández de Guevara et al. (2001) for the same European countries. In 
the case of market concentration, proxied by the Herfindahl index, the time evolution of 
the variable is similar to the Lerner index, falling until 1995 and increasing thereafter to 
such an extent that the concentration in 2000 (0.036) was practically similar to that of 
1993 (0.035). The increase in concentration in the second half of the 1990s may be due 
to the process of mergers and acquisitions among European banks, which may also be 
behind the explanation of the increase in market power 18. 
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 Bikker and Haaf (2002), using a broad sample of countries (European and non- European), analyse  the 
relationship between competition and concentration, their results showing that competition decreases as 
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The volatility of interest rates decreased greatly regardless of the interest rate 
used, the degree of inequality among countries in long term public debt rates being 
lower. Risk aversion increased in the years analysed, though it must be borne in mind 
that it is being proxied by the equity/assets ratio, so an increase was occurring in the 
levels of bank capitalisation in Europe. Credit risk, proxied by the loans/assets ratio, 
decreased from the mid-1990s onwards. Average costs decreased over the period 
studied, showing the effort made by European banks. The opportunity cost of reserves 
(liquidity) in 2000 was at a similar value to 1993, while the payment of implicit interest 
decreased during the period considered19. Finally, the cost to income ratio was fairly 
stable around an average level of 63%. 
 
5. Results 
The explanatory equation of the interest margin is estimated introducing fixed 
effects with the aim of capturing the influence of specific characteristics of each 
individual, using the within-group estimator20. Time effects are also introduced to 
capture the influence of variables specific to each year, as well as dummy variables 
specific to each country and to each institutional type of banking firm (banks, savings 
banks, cooperatives and others). 
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the explanatory equation of the 
interest margin for the pool of the five European countries considered. The different 
columns correspond to different empirical approaches to market structure (Lerner index 
versus Herfindahl index), and the volatility of interest rates (inter-bank, medium or long 
term debt). The results obtained show that in general all the variables are statistically 
significant and present the signs predicted by the theoretical model. Thus, market 
power, proxied by the Lerner index, affects the interest margin positively, and is highly 
significant. Interest rate risk also presents the expected positive sign, showing that firms 
that assume greater market risk work with higher interest margins. Likewise, the banks 
that assume greater credit risk present higher interest margins, though the explanatory 
capacity of this variable is less than that of interest rate risk. Risk aversion also presents 
the expected positive sign. 
                                                                                                                                               
market concentration increases. Consequently, the increased concentration following the wave of banking 
mergers in Europe, may negatively affect competition. 
19
 As verified by the European Central Bank (2000), in recent years the importance of non-interest income 
is increasing to the detriment of interest income. Consequently, the explicit collection of payments for 
banking services in the form of commissions means a smaller volume of implicit payments. 
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The explanatory capacity of operating costs deserves special mention. The high 
statistical significance of this variable shows the importance of introducing it into the 
theoretical explanation of the interest margin as done in the paper. Therefore, there 
could be a possible omitted variable bias of studies that ignore its importance21 As the 
theoretical model predicts, the banks that bear higher average operating expenses need 
to operate with higher margins to enable them to offset their higher transformation 
costs. 
With regard to the other variables introduced ad hoc into the regression – 
variables that do not appear in the explanation of the pure interest margin -, quality of 
management presents the expected negative sign (a higher value of the variable implies 
lower efficiency), and is highly significant. Implicit payments also present the predicted 
positive sign, so that the banks that charge for their services more implicitly through 
lower remuneration of liabilities, present higher interest margins. In the case of the 
opportunity cost of reserves, the results show the expected positive sign, though the 
variable is not statistically significant. 
Finally, dummy variables were introduced into the regression for each country22, 
to capture the possible importance of institutional differences (commercial banks, 
savings banks, credit cooperatives, and others23) and time effects. The results show the 
importance of the time effects that capture the influence of other variables specific to 
each time period; the value of the effects decreases as a consequence of the fall 
observed in interest margins. In no case is the institutional characteristic significant, and 
the country effect is significant only in the case of Italy (and negative in relation to 
Spain, the country of reference). 
Table 3 shows the economic significance of the interest margin determinants 
measured by the implicit elasticities evaluated at sample means. More specifically, the 
                                                                                                                                               
20
 The Hausman test allows the null hypothesis of absence of correlation between individual effects and 
the explanatory variables to be rejected in all cases, the GLS estimator of the random effects model being 
inconsistent. 
 
21
 Following the suggestion of one of the referees, we have re-estimated all the regressions omitting the 
operating costs variable. In this case, all the variables show the signs expected and the adjusted R2 shows 
a slight reduction. Given the importance of operating costs as a determinant of the interest margin, the 
results clearly show the bias produced in the estimation of the effect of the remaining determinants of the 
interest margin. Thus, the elasticities associated with the parameters estimated are reduced once the effect 
of average operating costs is introduced into the estimation, of special note being the reduction of around 
70% in the elasticity associated with quality of management (EF), credit risk (CRERISK) and opportunity 
costs of bank reserves (RESER). 
22
 The country of reference is Spain. 
23
 The “others” category includes the following types of firms: investment bank/securities house, medium 
& long term credit bank, non-banking credit institution, real estate/mortgage bank, and specialised 
government credit institution. The reference group is “others”. 
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table captures the effect on the interest margin of a 10% increase in its determining 
factors. With these results, the evolution of the interest margin in the banking sectors of 
the European Union responds more to variations in the quality of management, 
variations in the costs of production, and variations in the market power of the banking 
firms than to the uncertainty faced by banks (interest rate risk and credit risk ). In the 
particular case of operating costs, a 10% reduction in average operating costs would 
enable the interest margin to be reduced by 43%, its reduction in the period analysed 
being one of the most important factors in explaining the fall of the interest margin in 
the banking sector of the European Union. 
 To test the robustness of the results, columns (2) to (4) of table 4 present the 
results of the regression of the explanatory equation of the interest margin using: a) 
alternative variables to interest rates risk (columns (2) and (3); and b) the Herfindahl 
index as a measure of the competitive conditions in banking markets (column 4). The 
results are robust to the indicator of competitive structure of the markets, and to the 
interest rate used to measure the rate risk24.  
With the aim of testing for differences among countries in the explanatory power 
of the variables determining the interest margin, we estimated the explanatory equation 
of the interest margin separately for each of the banking sectors considered. The results 
of the estimation, which appear in table 425, allow us to observe that in the five 
countries analysed, the competitive structure of the markets, proxied by the Lerner 
index, is highly significant in explaining the interest margin26. Likewise, average costs 
and management quality are also significant and of the expected sign in the five 
countries. In the specific case of credit risk and of implicit interest payments, significant 
results are obtained in most cases. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of the 
reserves is significant only in Spain and the United Kingdom, while interest rate risk is 
significant only in the Spanish banking sector. 
 
 
                                                 
24In the case of credit risk, the loan loss provisions/total loans ratio is not statistically significant in any of 
the specifications used (results not shown), though the sample is unrepresentative (only 4,458 
observations) because this variable is available for only a small group of banks (for Germany, there are 
only 11 observations).  
25
 Table 4 reports the results corresponding to the base case (column 1 of table 2). The results with  
alternative specifications of the explanatory variables (HERF, SD3Y and SD10Y) are available upon 
request to the authors.  
26However, the influence of concentration is not significant in any case. The non- significance of 
concentration may be due to the lack of variability of the Herfindahl index (this variable takes a common 
value every year for all banks of the same country). 
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6. Conclusions 
The financial structure of European economies, unlike that of the USA, is 
characterised more by bank financing than by direct financing in the markets. With this 
in mind, various measures have been implemented in recent years to deregulate 
financial markets (e.g. the second banking directive) and to integrate them (e.g. the 
European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan) which have contributed to the 
reduction in the interest margins of Europe’s banking sectors. 
Starting from the model of Ho and Saunders (1981) and later extensions by other 
authors, this study analyses the determinants of the interest margin of the European 
banking sector on the basis of a broad sample of banks in Germany, Spain, Italy, France 
and the United Kingdom in the period 1993-2000. The model shows that the “pure” 
interest margin depends on the competitive conditions of the market, the interest rate 
risk, the credit risk, the average operating expenses and the risk aversion of banking 
firms, as well as on other variables not explicitly introduced into the model (opportunity 
cost of reserves, payment of implicit interest and quality of management).  
The study contributes to the existing literature in various directions. Firstly, it 
introduces into the modelling of the interest margin the influence of operating costs; 
secondly, it uses direct measures of market power to capture competitive conditions; 
thirdly, unlike the study by Saunders and Schumacher (2000), it analyses the 
determinants of the interest margins of European banks in a single stage, both extending 
the period of study to the year 2000 (instead of 1995) and using a much broader sample 
of banks (1,826 banks in 2000, as against the 614 in Saunders and Schumacher). 
The results obtained show that the variables posited by the theoretical model as 
explanatory of the interest margin are in general significant and of the predicted signs. 
The results obtained permit us to conclude that: 
a) Despite the deregulatory measures taken by the European Union in the 1990s, no  
increase in the competitive rivalry among banks can be appreciated. In this respect, 
the increase in the degree of concentration of European banks as a consequence of 
the wave of mergers that took place in the 1990s may have caused a reduction in the 
pressure of competition, and therefore, an increase in the market power of firms, 
which in turn causes upward pressure on interest margins. 
b) Nevertheless, the adverse consequences of diminishing competitive rivalry have 
been counteracted by the effect of the fall in operating costs and credit risk. 
Although the lower volatility of market interest rates has contributed to the 
reduction of interest margins, the effect has been very small. 
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c)  The change in the income structure of European banks has meant an increase in the 
importance of banking commissions and a reduction in the implicit payment of 
interest, which in turn has led to a reduction of the interest margin. 
d) One of the most significant variables in the explanation of the interest margin is the 
level of average production costs. In this respect, the containment of average costs 
experienced in European banking in recent years has been a decisive factor in 
enabling interest margins to be reduced. This supports the extension of the model 
done in this study, explicitly including operating costs as a variable endogenous to 
it. 
In the light of the evidence obtained, the continuity of the process of reduction of 
margins will be conditioned by the implementation of measures to incentivise above all 
the increase in the degree of competition (e.g. greater penetration by foreign banks or 
the development of alternative distribution channels for banking services such as 
internet banking, making markets more “contestable”), by banks’ efforts to reduce their 
average costs and to improve their efficiency levels, and by achieving a climate of 
financial stability that will reduce the risk faced by banking firms. 
The implications for economic policy that can be drawn from the results of this 
study start with the fact that the reduction of interest margins was originated by  factors 
which, in part, were driven by several years of a favourable economic situation, due (a) 
to a phase of economic growth which made reductions of costs possible in a context of 
growth of banking business and created an environment of low credit risk; and (b) to 
convergence in the economies of the euro zone, propitiating an environment of 
macroeconomic stability in which financial markets have shown low volatility. These 
factors seem to have offset a process of reduction of the levels of competition in 
Europe’s banking sectors, possibly influenced by the process of mergers and 
acquisitions. To the extent that the cyclical situation of the European economies has 
changed, the factors that in the past favoured the reduction of margins, may begin to 
exert pressure in the opposite direction. This phenomenon should cause a review of the 
effectiveness of the public policies implemented during recent years in the matter of 
competition, as this may be a fundamental factor in avoiding possible increases in the 
interest margins of Europe’s banking systems which would, in turn, make the process of 
financial intermediation more costly for society as a whole. 
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Appendix  
 
 Taking into account equation (5), the expected utility of the bank is27: 
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 When a new deposit, D, is made, the banking firm has to pay rDD and operating 
costs C(D), and will obtain a return (r+ZM)D in the money market. In this way, the 
bank’s final wealth will be: 
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   (A.2) 
and the expected utility after the new deposit has been made is given by the following 
expression: 
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Given the level of wealth after the arrival of the new deposit, the increase in 
expected utility is as follows: 
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In the same way, if the bank grants a new credit for an amount L it will receive 
an income rLL=(r+b+ZL)L, and incur operating costs C(L) and costs of financing the 
granting of credits (r+ZM)L. 
Analogously to the receiving of deposits, the increase of the bank’s expected 
utility due to the granting of an additional credit will be: 
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Bearing in mind the probabilities of granting credits or capturing deposits 
reflected in equation (8), the problem of maximization of (9) can be written: 
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 The first order conditions with respect to a and b give rise to the margins of 
expression (10). 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sample means
Symbol Definition 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
NIM % · Interest margin, defined as the difference between financial revenue and 
financial costs in relation to total assets 1.94 1.94 1.78 1.69 1.55 1.53 1.37 1.28
LERNER % · Lerner index of market power 15.84 14.77 14.38 14.96 15.97 15.19 16.61 16.80
HERF · Herfindahl index of national market concentration 0.035 0.029 0.026 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.036
AOC % · Average operating costs 1.67 1.65 1.58 1.54 1.48 1.49 1.43 1.36
RISKAVER % · Degree of risk aversion, proxied by the ratio equity/total assets 4.24 4.45 4.36 4.34 4.18 4.30 4.38 4.50
SD3M · Standard deviation of 3-month interest rate in the inter-bank market 1.04 0.35 0.47 0.29 0.25 0.19 0.33 0.58
SD3Y · Standard deviation of 3-year interest rate of the public debt 0.75 0.71 0.77 0.42 0.36 0.38 0.52 0.24
SD10Y · Standard deviation of 10-year interest rate of the public debt 0.57 0.71 0.44 0.39 0.25 0.43 0.57 0.16
CRERISK % · Credit risk, proxid by the loans/total assets ratio 50.48 50.83 50.38 49.68 48.37 48.63 45.34 46.89
SD3M*CRERISK · Interaction between credit risk (CRERISK) and market risk (SD3M) 0.52 0.18 0.24 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.27
SD3Y*CRERISK · Interaction between credit risk (CRERISK) and market risk (SD3Y) 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.21 0.26 0.08
SD10Y*CRERISK · Interaction between credit risk (CRERISK) and market risk (SD10Y) 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.11
SIZE · Size, proxied by the volume of loans granted (in logarithms) 13.20 13.22 13.25 13.12 13.04 13.08 13.03 13.21
IIP% · Implicit payments, defined as the ratio of operating expenses net of non-
interest revenues to total assets 0.83 1.04 0.94 0.87 0.72 0.73 0.62 0.50
RESER % · Opportunity costs of bank reserves, proxied by the ratio of liquid 
reserves/total assets 0.90 0.83 0.74 0.75 0.69 0.86 1.03 0.89
EF % · Efficiency (cost to income ratio) as a measure of quality of management
59.02 63.20 63.57 63.28 62.24 63.07 63.86 61.50
Number of firms 1,436 1,752 1,974 2,208 2,222 2,279 2,221 1,796
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration.
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Table 2. Determinants of the interest margin. 1993-2000
Total sample
Dependent variable: net interest margin (NIM)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
LERNER 0.0312 40.1901 0.0320 41.2046 0.0340 43.8228
HERF 0.0384 8.8455
SD3M 0.0021 10.0358 0.0014 6.2306
SD3Y 0.0021 8.0749
SD10Y 0.0043 14.9227
CRERISK 0.0010 2.0384 0.0014 2.6735 0.0033 6.3669 0.0036 6.7698
SD*CRERISK -0.0005 -1.4888 0.0006 1.2435 -0.0010 -2.0593 0.0000 0.0779
SIZE -0.0007 -7.3659 -0.0008 -8.0637 -0.0008 -7.9290 -0.0011 -9.8847
RISKAVER 0.0284 19.0836 0.0276 18.6302 0.0273 18.6284 0.0326 20.5863
AOC 0.4612 55.0686 0.4583 54.9539 0.4451 53.7494 0.4960 55.6477
EF -0.0190 -36.4234 -0.0190 -36.7214 -0.0182 -35.4821 -0.0341 -91.8070
IIP 0.4654 83.1024 0.4615 82.7148 0.4631 84.0629 0.3890 69.1152
RESER 0.0046 1.6074 0.0069 2.4442 0.0087 3.0984 0.0064 2.1047
FRANCE -0.0017 -0.7760 -0.0023 -1.0244 -0.0026 -1.1648 -0.0024 -0.9894
GERMANY 0.0013 0.5726 0.0011 0.4941 0.0010 0.4515 0.0009 0.3552
ITALY -0.0069 -3.0563 -0.0046 -2.0696 -0.0035 -1.5929 -0.0065 -2.7060
UK 0.0018 0.7846 0.0022 0.9960 0.0033 1.4906 0.0042 1.7556
COMMERCIAL BANKS 0.0006 0.2594 0.0005 0.2173 0.0004 0.1672 0.0006 0.2600
SAVING BANKS -0.0010 -0.4486 -0.0011 -0.4813 -0.0012 -0.5276 -0.0012 -0.4835
CO-OPERATIVE BANKS 0.0002 0.0786 0.0002 0.0692 0.0001 0.0357 0.0004 0.1660
TE(1994) 0.0012 11.0950 0.0000 0.3477 -0.0006 -7.2878 0.0015 13.2459
TE(1995) 0.0006 5.4951 -0.0005 -6.1079 0.0000 -0.4782 0.0011 9.2793
TE(1996) 0.0004 3.5386 -0.0001 -1.2192 -0.0003 -3.5880 0.0009 6.8979
TE(1997) -0.0003 -2.8222 -0.0008 -8.6662 -0.0006 -6.4681 0.0000 0.3049
TE(1998) -0.0010 -7.8349 -0.0016 -16.3667 -0.0020 -22.8096 -0.0007 -4.9967
TE(1999) -0.0021 -18.2430 -0.0028 -30.6336 -0.0034 -38.8613 -0.0016 -12.8509
TE(2000) -0.0027 -26.1662 -0.0023 -21.1184 -0.0021 -20.2032 -0.0024 -22.1583
Number of observations 15,888 15,888 15,888 15,888
Adjusted R2 0.9624 0.9627 0.9636 0.9571
Hausman Test (p-value) 330 0.0000 3,096 0.0000 3,333 0.0000 1,278 0.0000
LM Heterokedasticity (p-value) 1,405 0.0000 1,408 0.0000 1,401 0.0000 1,999 0.0000
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration.
Note: The excluded dummy categories are SPAIN (dummy variable indicating operation in a national banking sector), OTHERS (dummy variable 
indicating institutional type of banking firm), TE(1993) (time effects).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 3. Economic significance of the interest margin determinants
Determinant (1)
LERNER 29.67
SD3M 0.06
CRERISK 3.04
SD*CRERISK -0.01
SIZE -0.60
RISKAVER 7.53
AOC 43.00
EF -72.59
IIP 22.22
RESER 0.23
Note: The data in the table indicate the percentage variation of 
the interest margin in response to a 10% increase in its 
determinants, evaluated at average sample values.
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Table 4. Determinants of the interest margin. 1993-2000
Regressions by countries
Dependent variable: net interest margin (NIM)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
LERNER 0.0795 26.6108 0.0591 97.5258 0.0452 35.9097 0.0492 11.0154
SD3M 0.0003 0.2021 -0.0004 -0.2331 0.0023 1.2589 0.0042 3.6533
CRERISK 0.0007 0.5513 0.0018 5.2846 0.0046 3.8935 -0.0012 -0.5644
SD*CRERISK 0.0014 2.9686 0.0000 0.0435 0.0007 0.7548 -0.0017 -1.5765
SIZE -0.0008 -4.2652 0.0008 10.8604 -0.0019 -6.3448 0.0004 1.2328
RISKAVER -0.0066 -1.4227 0.0409 26.5629 0.0044 1.3359 0.0551 12.1041
AOC 0.1617 7.9250 0.2418 40.4262 0.3167 20.0274 0.3565 7.6525
EF -0.0070 -4.3662 -0.0100 -29.5313 -0.0254 -23.8109 -0.0260 -9.1909
IIP 1.0056 75.4550 0.8125 137.4370 0.8001 53.7234 1.0152 26.3167
RESER -0.0033 -0.3670 0.0016 1.0220 -0.0139 -0.9501 0.0191 2.0877
COMMERCIAL BANKS 0.0015 0.6276 0.0018 2.3831 0.0024 1.4584 0.0005 0.2477
SAVING BANKS 0.0015 0.6118 -0.0002 -0.2458 -0.0020 -1.2467 -0.0002 -0.0880
CO-OPERATIVE BANKS -0.0005 -0.2049 -0.0002 -0.2227 -0.0045 -2.7784 0.0017 0.8691
TE(1994) 0.0008 0.3279 -0.0008 -1.1273 0.0003 0.2107 0.0037 1.9558
TE(1995) 0.0000 -0.0272 -0.0014 -2.3407 0.0006 0.6003 0.0039 1.9840
TE(1996) -0.0001 -0.0360 -0.0022 -2.1320 -0.0005 -0.6908 0.0022 1.4612
TE(1997) -0.0006 -0.2327 -0.0025 -2.8304 -0.0007 -0.4181 0.0014 0.7432
TE(1998) -0.0010 -0.3935 -0.0030 -2.6739 -0.0029 -3.2459 0.0000 0.0014
TE(1999) -0.0021 -0.9099 -0.0034 -4.6357 -0.0035 -2.0609 -0.0018 -0.9224
TE(2000) -0.0023 -1.1873 -0.0031 -9.3445 -0.0045 -3.6828 -0.0018 -1.0783
Adj R2 0.9862 0.9855 0.9795 0.9864
Hausman Test (p-value) 232.3240 0.0000 852.3339 0.0000 1,767.3868 0.0000 119.0577 0.0000
LM Heterokedasticity (p-value) 1,337.0962 0.0000 507.6940 0.0000 150.4497 0.0000 8.0869 0.0045
Note: see tables 1 and 2
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration.
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